On the Resilience of Wireless Multiuser Networks to Passive and Active Eavesdroppers by Chorti, Arsenia et al.
HAL Id: hal-01686327
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01686327
Submitted on 17 Jan 2018
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
On the Resilience of Wireless Multiuser Networks to
Passive and Active Eavesdroppers
Arsenia Chorti, Samir Perlaza, Zhu Han, Harold Vincent Poor
To cite this version:
Arsenia Chorti, Samir Perlaza, Zhu Han, Harold Vincent Poor. On the Resilience of Wireless Multiuser
Networks to Passive and Active Eavesdroppers. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2013. ￿hal-01686327￿
1
On the Resilience of Wireless Multiuser Networks
to Passive and Active Eavesdroppers
Arsenia Chorti†,∗, Samir M. Perlaza†, Zhu Han‡, H. Vincent Poor†
†Dep. EE, Equad 19 Olden Street, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544, USA
∗ICS-FORTH N. Plastira 100, Vassilika Vouton, GR-700 13 Heraklion, Crete, Greece
‡Dep. ECE, N324, Engineering Building 1, University of Houston, Houston, TX 77004.
{achorti, perlaza, poor}@princeton.edu, zhan2@mail.uh.edu
Abstract—Physical layer security can provide alternative
means for securing the exchange of confidential messages in wire-
less applications. In this paper, the resilience of wireless multiuser
networks to passive (interception of the broadcast channel) and
active (interception of the broadcast channel and false feedback)
eavesdroppers is investigated. Stochastic characterizations of the
secrecy capacity (SC) are obtained in scenarios involving a
base station and several destinations. The expected values and
variances of the SC along with the probabilities of secrecy outages
are evaluated in the following cases: (i) in the presence of passive
eavesdroppers without any side information; (ii) in the presence
of passive eavesdroppers with side information about the number
of eavesdroppers; and (iii) in the presence of a single active
eavesdropper with side information about the behavior of the
eavesdropper. This investigation demonstrates that substantial
secrecy rates are attainable on average in the presence of
passive eavesdroppers as long as minimal side information is
available. On the other hand, it is further found that active
eavesdroppers can potentially compromise such networks unless
statistical inference is employed to restrict their ability to attack.
Interestingly, in the high signal to noise ratio regime, multiuser
networks become insensitive to the activeness or passiveness of
the attack.
Index Terms—Secrecy capacity, secrecy rate, physical layer
security, outage probability, multiuser diversity, multiple eaves-
droppers, slow fading and side information.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security in the exchange of information has been pri-
marily treated as an inherently applied subject, despite the
theoretical formulation of perfect secrecy early on [1]. In
actual networks, security commonly relies on cryptographic
algorithms [2] implemented at upper layers of the protocol
stack. Recently, a compelling complementary approach for
enhancing the securing of wireless systems has risen from the
area of information theory and has become a focal point of
research in the wireless community. The breakthrough concept
of physical layer security is to exploit the characteristics of the
wireless medium such as fading or noise to ensure secrecy in
wireless transmissions [3], [4], [5], [6].
Seminal earlier analyses that investigated security aspects
of the wiretap channel [7] and the broadcast channel with
confidential messages (BCC) [8] have established that a noisy
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2010-274723) grant within the 7th Framework Program of the European
Community and in part by the Qatar National Research Fund (QNRF) and U.S.
National Science Foundation Grants CCF-1016671, CNS-0905556, CNS-
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communication channel can offer opportunities for perfectly
secure exchange of information. The performance measure
of interest, the secrecy capacity (SC), was defined as the
largest communication rate for which encoding schemes exist
that simultaneously guarantee reliability in the exchange of
information with a legitimate user and perfect secrecy with
respect to an eavesdropper. It has been demonstrated that the
SC is strictly positive when the wiretap channel is on average
a degraded version of the main channel. Specifically in the
case of Gaussian encoders, the SC can be expressed as the
difference between the main and the eavesdropper’s channel
capacities, CM and CW respectively, [9],
Cs = [CM −CW ]+ = [log(1 + SNRM )− log(1 + SNRW )]+
(1)
where [·]+ = max(·, 0), SNRM and SNRW denote the
signal-to-noise-ratios (SNRs) of the main and eavesdropping
channels, respectively1.
Similar results were obtained for wireless fading channels
[10], [11], [12] and multiple input multiple output (MIMO)
systems [13], [14], [15], [16] to cite but a few. Furthermore,
many investigations have considered systems with friendly
or un-trusted relays [17], [18], [19] approaches relying on
intentionally degrading the eavesdropper SNR using friendly
interferers [20], [21], [22], etc. Finally, more recently, in-
vestigations have appeared for scenarios involving multiple
legitimate users and a single eavesdropper [23], [24] or a single
legitimate user and multiple eavesdroppers [25]. Some work
from resource allocation perspective can be found in [26], [27],
[28].
In this paper, we build on earlier works that provide single
letter characterizations of the SC for the broadcast fading
channel and investigate broadcast networks in the presence of
multiple eavesdroppers. We assume that a central management
unit (base station (BS)) decides on the allocation of network
resources (bandwidth and power) in order to convey secret
messages to one of K destinations. Evidently, in this setting,
the SC depends on the relative SNR levels of the strongest
user (in terms of SNR) and the strongest eavesdropper. The
ordering of the respective SNRs involves the use of order
statistics of the respective channel gains. We model the
channel coefficients as realizations of a random process with
1Logarithms hereafter are taken base 2.
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an underlying Rayleigh probability density function (pdf)2.
Assuming that the wireless channel is memoryless and the
multiplicative fading coefficients are stationary and ergodic
over time, we are primarily concerned with the stochastic
characterization of the SC as a function of the cell size K,
the side information available and the fierceness of the attack.
In particular, to the best of our knowledge, the present paper
presents the first systematic probabilistic characterization of
the SC in the following cases:
1) Purely antagonistic networks in the absence of any side
information. In this worst case scenario, all subscribed
users in a network can in parallel act as eavesdroppers,
intercepting the exchange of confidential messages in-
tended for other users. Characterizing probabilistically
the SC in the absence of any side information, we readily
demonstrate that any opportunities for secure exchange
of information vanish with an increase in the size of the
network, i.e. with increasing K, the average SC tends to
0. Our findings indicate that in real networks, securing
any single user against all other users or alternatively an
arbitrarily large number of adversaries is not attainable
in practical terms.
2) Networks with distinct sets of legitimate users and eaves-
droppers. In actual commercial applications, intuitively,
only a small number of adversaries may have an interest
in compromising the security of the network. Based
on this reasoning, we next consider the scenario in
which the sets of legitimate users and eavesdroppers are
distinct. Furthermore, we assume that quantitative side
information is available regarding the cardinality of the
set of eavesdroppers. Such minimal knowledge proves a
decisive factor for secure network planning purposes;
we demonstrate that upper-bounding the number of
passive eavesdroppers and increasing the cell size leads
to substantial opportunities for realizing perfectly secure
transmissions.
3) Networks in the presence of a single active eavesdrop-
per. In our model, an active eavesdropper possesses an
optimal receiver, has global channel state information
(CSI) and additionally exchanges signalling messages
with the BS, appearing as a legitimate user. The goal
of this adversary is not only to intercept the broadcast
channel but also to interferer with the decision making
process regarding the allocation of resources in order to
increase the amount of secret information leaked. Our
findings indicate that in order for the BS to counteract
such malicious behavior, qualitative side information
is required concerning behavioral aspects of the active
eavesdropper tactics. Intuitively, a fiercer type of attack
requires stronger defence mechanisms.
The paper is organized as follows: the problem formulation
is outlined in Section II. The scenario of passive eavesdropping
without side information is examined in Section III, while
in Section IV results are presented when quantitative side
information is available. In Section V, the case of active
2Our results can straightforwardly be extended to the general case of
Nakagami-m distributions.
Fig. 1. Broadcast network in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers.
eavesdropping is investigated, which is formulated as a one-
shot two player zero-sum game. In Section VI, the SC in
the high SNR regime is stochastically characterized while in
Section VII heuristic transmission strategies are compared.
Finally, Section VIII includes the conclusions of this study.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider the system set up illustrated in Fig. 1 correspond-
ing to a typical downlink scenario in a multiuser network.
A central management unit or BS communicates with a set
K = {1, 2, . . . ,K} of K = |K| destinations in the presence
of a set E = {1, 2, . . . , E} of E = |E| eavesdroppers.
Communication occurs in consecutive transmission frames.
During each time frame, the BS transmits to destination
k∗ ∈ K a message s = (s(1), . . . , s(q)) ∈ Sq , whose elements
are uniformly drawn from a set of source symbols S.
In the present investigation, the destination k∗ is determined
on the sole criterion of keeping the eavesdroppers as igno-
rant as possible of the message transmitted by the source.
Towards this end, the BS employs an encoding function
φ : Sq → Xn, with X the set of transmitted symbols. Each
codeword is a sequence of n-elements denoted by x = φ(s),

















For random encoding arguments to hold, we further assume
that i) the channel realizations between the source and all
destinations and eavesdroppers remain constant during a given
frame, and ii) communication frames are long enough to allow
the transmission of infinite length codewords, n→ ∞, invok-
ing that the channel capacities can be asymptotically reached.
In this framework and focusing on one transmission frame,
the channel realization between the source and destination k is
denoted by hk, with k ∈ K. Similarly, the channel realization
between the source and the eavesdropper j is denoted by h̃j ,
with j ∈ E .
All channel realizations are assumed to be ergodic over time
and independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) from chan-
nel to channel drawn from a zero-mean unit variance complex
Gaussian distribution. Thus, all channel gains gk = |hk|2
and g̃j =
h̃j2 are random variables drawn from a chi-
square probability distribution with 2 degrees of freedom, with
underlying pdf
f(λ) = e−λ, (3)
and a corresponding cumulative distribution function (cdf)
F (λ) = 1− e−λ. (4)
It is noteworthy that the results presented in the following
sections can straightforwardly be generalized to the case of
Nakagami-m channels by appropriately defining f(λ) and
F (λ), respectively [29].
During a given communication frame, the outputs of optimal
receivers at destination k, yk = (yk(1), . . . , yk(n)) and eaves-
dropper j, zj = (zj(1), . . . , zj(n)) are expressed, respectively,
as follows:
∀k ∈ K, yk = gkx+wk, (5)
∀j ∈ E , zj = g̃jx+ w̃j . (6)
yk ∈ Yn and zj ∈ Zn, where Y and Z are obser-
vations at the destination and the eavesdropper. The terms
wk = (wk(1), . . . , wk(n)) and w̃j = (w̃j(1), . . . , w̃j(n))
are n-dimensional vectors whose components are zero-mean
unit-variance circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random
variables.
At destination k, the decoding function ϕk : Yn → Sq
is used to recover the source symbols from the observations.
The error probability associated with the code (φ, ϕ) during a
particular transmission interval at destination k is defined as
P (k)e = Pr (ϕk(yk) ̸= s) . (7)
The level of ignorance of eavesdropper j with respect to the
transmitted message is measured by its equivocation rate R(j)e .
That is, the rate of the entropy of the message S conditioned





H(S|Zj ,h, h̃). (8)
In the following, we focus on information theoretic perfect
secrecy, implying that the equivocation rate is at least equal
to the rate of the message R. Perfectly secret transmission at
rate R is achieved at destination k∗ if for any arbitrarily small
ϵ > 0, there exists a sequence of codes (2nR, n) such that for
n→ ∞, the following hold [7], [8]:
P (k
∗)
e 6 ϵ, (9)
∀j ∈ E , R(j)e =
1
n
H(S|Sj ,h, h̃)) > R− ϵ. (10)
During a given transmission frame, the secrecy capacity Cs








I(X;Y k∗ |h, h̃))− I(X;Zj∗ |h, h̃)
= [log(1 + gk∗pmax)− log(1 + g̃j∗pmax)]+, (11)
where indices k∗ and j∗ denote the most capable (in terms
of SNR) of the destinations and eavesdroppers, respectively.
Solving the optimization problem (11) to pmax is a conse-
quence of the monotonicity of the SC as a function of the
power in slow fading conditions. For fast fading channels,
transmitting at constant power under an average power con-
straint is no longer optimal and power control should be
adopted [30].
Finally, an underlying assumption of the present study
is that potential eavesdropping terminals do not cooperate,
i.e., we examine the scenario of non-colluding eavesdroppers.
This is a plausible assumption in a purely individualistic
network where an eavesdropper would hesitate to reveal its
identity to probably “friendly” eavesdroppers in order not
to jeopardize its own safety (being identified and “removed”
from the network). The more pessimistic scenario of optimally
cooperating eavesdroppers is to be investigated in future work.
III. STOCHASTIC CHARACTERIZATION OF THE SC IN
ABSENCE OF SIDE INFORMATION
We commence our investigation by examining the case in
which the BS has no side information regarding the existence
of eavesdroppers. As a worst case approach, the network
is treated as purely antagonistic; the BS assumes that all
subscribed users act as passive eavesdroppers intercepting the
broadcasting of confidential messages to other users. Aiming at
evaluating lower bounds, in this scenario the set of destinations
K is extended to include any terminal that can act as an
eavesdropper, i.e., E ⊂ K. We finally note that in this
blind approach, we should in principle allow the number of
eavesdroppers to grow unboundedly, i.e., K → ∞. In this
setting, only the strongest of K destinations has potentially
a non-zero SC. The SC during a transmission frame strictly
depends on the SNR difference between the destination with
the highest SNR and the destination with the second highest
SNR. For ease of notation, we denote the former with index








Fig. 2. Joint probability of the K-th and (K − 1)-th order statistics of the
fading channel for K = 100.
Building on the assumption that the channel realizations gk∗





K−1(gk∗∗), respectively, are the K-th and (K − 1)-th order
statistics of a sample of K channel realizations:
f
(K)




K−1 (λ) = K(K − 1)F (λ)
K−2(1− F (λ))f(λ) (15)
with cdfs F (K)K (λ) and F
(K)
K−1(λ), respectively. The concept of
ordering the channel gains in physical layer security studies
is a central point of our approach and its significance will be
emphasized throughout the rest of this study.
The random variables gk∗ and gk∗∗ are generated through
a common ordering operation over the set of K channel
realizations, which is clearly a nonlinear transformation. As
a result, they are not independent [31]. Based on the general
expression for the joint pdf of any two order statistics [31],
the joint pdf f (K)K,K−1(gk∗ , gk∗∗) of gk∗ and gk∗∗ is derived as
f
(K)
K,K−1(gk∗ , gk∗∗) = K(K − 1)F (gk∗∗)
K−2f(gk∗∗)
× f(gk∗)U(gk∗ − gk∗∗), (16)
where U(·) is the step function and is depicted in Fig. 2.
The SC is a random process that we will fully characterize
in the following, generalizing the reasoning presented in [10]
and [11], assuming that the fading channel is wide sense
stationary3. We begin by deriving the pdf of the SC and then
evaluate its expected value and variance.
Theorem 1 [Pdf of the SC without side information]: The pdf
fCs(Cs) of the SC Cs when the legitimate destination is chosen
following (12) and all the other destinations are considered
as passive eavesdroppers can be expressed as












3The assumption of a wide sense stationary fading channel can be removed
if we let the underlying pdfs of the channel coefficients become time
dependent functions.


































− (1 + λ)µ

dµ. (18)






, we note that the pdf of the ratio ξ = λµ
of two non-negative dependent random variables with joint pdf




µfΛM (µξ, µ)dµ. (19)
Furthermore, the pdf of the output of a hard limiter ξ = [λ]+
when the pdf of the input is fΛ(λ), is a discontinuous function
at the origin and equals
fΞ(ξ) = fΛ(ξ)U(ξ) + Pr(λ ≤ 0)δ(ξ). (20)
From the previous discussion, the pdf of the SC is derived
from the joint pdf of gk∗ and gk∗∗ by performing the following
sequence of operations: i) ϕ = 1 + gk∗p, ψ = 1 + gk∗∗p, ii)
ξ = ϕψ , iii) η = log(ξ), and iv) Cs = [η]
+. 
In Fig. 3 the pdf of the SC is depicted for K = 3, 5 and
8 destinations. As the number of destinations increases, the
pdf mass concentrates on smaller values of the SC, implying
that with increasing cell size the expected value of the SC
decreases. We conjecture that for K → ∞, the probability
mass of the SC is concentrated at the point Cs = 0+. Evidence
of the validity of this conjecture is provided by the evaluation
of the expected value and the variance of the SC:
Proposition 1 [Expected value and variance of the SC]:
The expected value and the variance of the SC when the
legitimate destination is chosen following (12) and all the
other destinations are considered as passive eavesdroppers

























































































































× f (K)K,K−1(λ, µ)dµdλ− E [Cs]
2(22)
respectively.
Numerical evaluations4 of the expectation and the standard
deviation of the secrecy capacity are depicted in Figs. 4
and 5, respectively. As expected, the average SC reduces
monotonically with the cardinality K of K. This is due to the
fact that the probability of finding two destinations with similar
SNR levels increases monotonically with K. Thus, from (21) it
becomes clear that in the absence of any side information, the
broadcasting of secret messages can be compromised, unless a
substantial decrease in the transmission rate can be tolerated.
We further note that the mean value of the ratio of the
standard deviation to the expected value is roughly equal to









































Fig. 6. Secrecy outage probability without side information as a function of
K for pmax = 0 dB.
0.85 (it increases slightly with an increase in the cell size).
The large variations around the expected value impose further
restrictions in the design of perfectly secure multiuser network
transmission protocols.
On the contrary, given the problem formulation, the proba-
bility of a positive secrecy capacity is unity and can be derived
noting that by definition gk∗ ≥ gk∗∗ :
Proposition 2 [Secrecy outage probability]: In a set of K non-
colluding destinations, the probability of a positive secrecy
capacity is the probability mass of f (K)K,K−1(gk∗ , gk∗∗) in the
entire plane of admissible values of gk∗ and gk∗∗ and is
therefore unity,







K,K−1(λ, µ)dµdλ = 1. (23)
The probability of a secrecy outage, with respect to a tar-
get threshold secrecy capacity value τ , is the probability
mass of f (K)K,K−1(gk∗ , gk∗∗) in the left of the plane gk∗∗ =
1+gk∗pmax−2τ
2τpmax
and is given by
















In Fig. 6 numerical evaluations of the secrecy outage prob-
ability are depicted for pmax = 0 dB. These numerical eval-
uations further stress the dramatic effect - in terms of perfect
secrecy - of the antagonistic relations between all destinations,
even for medium size networks of K = 30 destinations. For
example, transmitting perfectly secret messages at a rate of 0.5
bits/sec/Hz is only possible roughly 20% of the time due to the
fact that the most capable destination in a given transmission
frame is being attacked by K−1 = 29 eavesdroppers. Finally,
it is noted that for τ = 0.8 bits/sec/Hz numerical errors in
the evaluation of the outage probability result in less accurate
evaluations.
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The importance of side information in multiuser networks
is highlighted in the next section where reverse conclusions
are drawn by adopting a more realistic and less pessimistic
point of view. The investigations presented next are motivated
by the intuition that in typical commercial applications the
vast majority of destinations have no interest in eavesdropping;
malicious behavior is on the contrary confined to a small set
of adversaries.
IV. STOCHASTIC CHARACTERIZATION OF THE SC WITH
SIDE INFORMATION
In this section, we consider that there exists a set E
of eavesdroppers that wish to decode secret messages and
that this set is distinct from the set of destinations K, i.e.,
E
T
K = ∅. Nevertheless, although the individual identities of
the eavesdroppers are unknown, side information is available
regarding the cardinality E = |E| of the set of potential
eavesdropping terminals5. Amongst this population, we em-
ploy index j∗ to denote the eavesdropping terminal that has
the highest statistical advantage for eavesdropping. In the
present work we further assume that the eavesdroppers are
not cooperating.
A. Side Information over the Exact Number of Eavesdroppers
Assuming that side information over the exact number of
eavesdroppers is available, the pdf f (E)E (g̃j∗) of the channel
gain g̃j∗ of the most capable eavesdropper (in terms of SNR
strength) can be characterized as the E-th order statistics of a
sample of E channel realizations,
f
(E)
E (λ) = EF (λ)
E−1f(λ) (25)
with cdf F (E)E (λ). It is important to note that in the case under
examination g∗k and g̃
∗
j are generated from two independent
ordering operations and consequently are independent (we
make no assumption over the ordering of gk∗ with respect to






j ) of the channel gain of the
strongest destination and the strongest eavesdropper is merely
the product of the marginal distributions, i.e.,
f
(K)(E)





As a result the pdf of the SC is derived as follows:
Theorem 2 [Pdf of the SC with side information]: The pdf
fC∗s (C
∗
s ) of the SC C
∗
s in a set of K non-colluding desti-
nations in the presence of a distinct set of E non-colluding
eavesdroppers can be expressed as
fC∗s (C
∗
s ) = fC∗k∗ (C
∗





+ Pr(C∗k∗ ≤ C∗j∗)δ(C∗s ) (27)
where
C∗k∗ = log(1 + gk∗p), (28)



















5In a sense we assume that a statistical characterization of the vulnerability
of the wireless network has been performed and priors were extracted.























Fig. 7. Pdf of the SC with side information over the existence of E =
1 eavesdropper. The weights of the delta discontinuities at the origin (not
depicted here) are Pr(C∗k∗ ≤ C
∗
j∗ ) = 0.17, 0.02, 0.01 for K = 5, 30, and
100, respectively.
where ⊗ denotes convolution and











Proof : The derivation of (27) is straightforward based on the
substraction of two independent random variables and passing
the output through a hard limiter. (32) is the consequence of
defining p on a continuous support so that Pr(p = 0) = 0. 
Numerical evaluations of the pdf of the SC are depicted in
Fig. 7 for a single eavesdropper in networks of K = 5, 30, and
100 destinations. With increasing cell size K, the probability
mass concentrates to higher values of the SC C∗s , reversing
the conclusions drawn in the section without side information.
Furthermore, with K → ∞ the discontinuity of C∗s at the
origin vanishes, i.e., Pr(C∗k∗ ≤ C∗j∗) → 0, implying that
almost surely a positive SC can be established.
In the case of non-cooperative eavesdroppers, the expected
value and the variance of the SC of the network with respect
to a set E , E = |E| of eavesdroppers can be expressed as
Proposition 3 [Expected value and variance of the SC]:
The average SC of a set of K non-colluding destinations
with respect to a distinct set of E non-colluding passive
eavesdroppers is given by


































× f (K)K (λ)f
(E)





respectively, with f (K)K (λ)dλ = dF
(K)












































Fig. 8. Expected value of the SC with side information over the existence











































Fig. 9. Expected value of the SC with side information over the existence
of E = 5 eavesdroppers as a function of K.
Numerical evaluations of (33) are depicted in Figs. 8 and 9
in the presence of E = 1 and E = 5 eavesdropping terminals,
respectively. Notably, in the case of a single eavesdropper, the
expected value of the SC approaches substantial values as the
cell size increases. This results from the substantial increase in
the probability of finding a destination with a higher SNR than
the eavesdropper. This observation recalls the notion of multi-
user diversity [33]. Furthermore, albeit the expected value of
the SC decreases with increasing numbers of eavesdroppers,
substantial secrecy rates are still attainable on average when
the legitimate users outnumber the eavesdroppers, i.e., E ≪
K.
Furthermore, numerical evaluations of (34) are depicted
in Figs. 10 and 11 for E = 1 and E = 5 eavesdroppers
respectively. The ratio of the standard deviation to the expected
value monotonically decreases with increasing K, while the
standard deviation decreases with increasing E. For E = 1 and












































Fig. 10. Standard deviation of the SC with side information over the existence











































Fig. 11. Standard deviation of the SC with side information over the existence
of E = 5 eavesdroppers as a function of K.
approximately 0.38 for K = 100. This effect is the immediate
consequence of keeping the number of eavesdroppers constant
while increasing K. Therefore, increasing the cell size in the
presence of a limited number of adversaries creates some
room for network planning and rate adaptation around the
expected value of the secrecy capacity. Relevant directions will
be discussed in the final section of this paper.
Finally, the probability of a secrecy outage can be derived
as
Proposition 4 [Secrecy outage probability]: In a set of K
non-colluding terminals, the probability of a positive SC with
respect to a distinct set of E non-colluding eavesdroppers is
the probability mass of f (K)(E)K,E (gk∗ , g̃j∗) in the left of the
plane gk∗ = g̃j∗ and is given by













































Fig. 12. Probability of positive SC with side information over the existence




































Fig. 13. Secrecy outage probability with side information over the existence
of a single eavesdropper as a function of K.
The probability of a secrecy outage, with respect to a target
threshold secrecy capacity value τ , is the probability mass of
f
(K)(E)
K,E (gk∗ , g̃j∗) in the left of the plane g̃j∗ =
1+gk∗pmax−2τ
2τpmax
and is given by
Pout = Pr(C
∗


















In Fig. 12 numerical evaluations of the probability of
positive SC are depicted for E = 1 and E = 5 eavesdroppers.
Increasing the cell size to K = 100 destinations invokes that
in the presence of a single eavesdropper a positive secrecy
capacity can be established almost surely. Additionally, in Fig.
13 the probability of a secrecy outage has been evaluated
in the case of E = 1 eavesdropper. It is noteworthy that
a target secrecy rate of 0.5 bits/sec/Hz can be established
approximately 90% of the time for a cell size of K = 30
destinations; moderate perfectly secure rates are attainable
with high probability when E ≪ K.
B. Side Information over the Distribution of the Number of
Eavesdroppers
Relaxing the requirement for obtaining side information on
the exact number of eavesdropping terminals, we now explore
the case where a probability mass function (pmf) over the
number of eavesdroppers is available. We define the random
variable ε of the number of eavesdropping terminals, i.e. for





Noting that ε, gk∗ and g̃j∗ are independent and that their joint
pdf is concentrated on the discrete points εi, we can employ
the results of the previous section and derive the pdf of the
SC as follows:
Theorem 3 [Pdf of the SC with side information over the dis-
tribution of the number of eavesdroppers]: The pdf fC∗s (C
∗
s )
of the SC C∗s in a set of K non colluding destinations in the
presence of a distinct set of ε non colluding eavesdroppers
with pmf fE(ε) can be expressed as
fC∗s (C
∗
s ) = fC∗k∗ (C
∗



































We have so far demonstrated the importance of side in-
formation in broadcast networks with multiple eavesdroppers.
It has been shown that understanding the vulnerability of
the wireless network to passive attacks can create opportu-
nities for building perfectly secure systems with satisfactory
data rates for common commercial applications. However,
given the extra effort devoted to enhancing the robustness of
the network, it is only reasonable to assume that potential
eavesdroppers will on the other hand take countermeasures
to mitigate any advantages gained. In the next section we
investigate such a scenario. A single eavesdropper tries to
confuse the BS in order to establish opportunities for listening
to secret conversations, i.e. the eavesdropper becomes active.
V. STOCHASTIC CHARACTERIZATION OF THE SC WITH
SIDE INFORMATION IN THE PRESENCE OF AN ACTIVE
EAVESDROPPER
Next, we consider the scenario in which a single active
eavesdropper is registered in the network as a subscribed user
and exchanges signaling messages with the BS. For simplicity,
it is further assumed that the only objective of this malicious
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user is to decode private messages of any legitimate user (this
scenario is a subcase of the Byzantine attack [34] [35]). The
information accumulated by the eavesdropper depends on the
transmission rate and its equivocation rate, with eavesdropping
referring to overhearing other users’ data.
In this setting, the eavesdropper should intuitively adopt the
following strategy:
1) If it has the highest CSI during a given channel re-
alization, i.e., g̃j∗ > gk∗ , then it can report a false
CSI ǵj∗ < gk∗ to the BS. If the BS does not identify
the forgery, it will transmit a private message x to a
legitimate user k∗. In this case, the eavesdropper will
be able to at least partially decode x;
2) If the eavesdropper does not have the highest SNR, it
might not be able to eavesdrop. In this case, it can
report a higher false CSI ǵj∗ > gk∗ claiming network
resources from the BS. If the BS chooses to transmit
to the eavesdropper, although no private information is
leaked, the network resources are wasted as none of the
legitimate destinations receives any new information.
In such a setting, it would appear that the legitimate users
are completely unprotected against active attacks. Neverthe-
less, at least in principle, deviations in reported CSIs could
be bounded around the true value. For example, in the case
of a dense network primarily populated by legitimate users,
the BS can employ statistical tests to isolate malicious nodes
[36]. Bearing this in mind, we are interested in investigating
the network’s resilience to active eavesdroppers. That is,
eavesdroppers that can mislead the transmitter by introducing
false information about their own CSI.
Let us assume the following: (i) the BS can potentially
transmit only to the user with the highest reported CSI and
(ii) the eavesdropper always reports a CSI ǵj∗ that deviates
from its true CSI g̃j∗ by a certain additive quantity ϵ, i.e.,
ǵj∗ = g̃j∗ + ϵ. Given these assumptions, we define the
following function u : R+ ×R → R, with












where 1{·} denotes the indicator function. The BS should aim
at the maximization of u(p, ϵ), while the eavesdropper at its
minimization.
Discussing the problem in more detail, we identify the
following cases:
1) When gk∗ > ǵj∗ and gk∗ > g̃j∗ , then u (p, ϵ) > 0. Thus,
the strict positiveness of u is a necessary and sufficient
condition for guaranteeing perfect secrecy.
2) When u (p, ϵ) = 0, the BS either does not transmit
at all or it transmits to the eavesdropper. In this case,
no private messages are leaked. However, the network
efficiency is compromised.
3) When u (p, ϵ) < 0, the eavesdropper is able to partially
decode the messages of a legitimate user.
In the following, we study the optimal behavior of the
BS and the eavesdropper with respect to the function u, by
adopting the assumption of full CSI availability at both the
transmitter and eavesdropper. This serves only as a first theo-
retical approximation to determine secrecy rate bounds under
the assumption of fully rational base station and eavesdropper.
A. BS Optimal Strategy
Given the action adopted by the eavesdropper, the optimal
action of the BS is to choose its transmit power to maximize
the function u in (42). That is, the best response of the
transmitter, denoted by BRB : R → {0, pmax}, is
BRB(ϵ) = arg max
p∈{0,pmax}




pmax, if gk∗ > max(g̃j∗ , ǵj∗),
0, otherwise. (44)
B. Eavesdropper Optimal Strategy
The choices of the eavesdropper consist of reporting a
forged CSI ǵj∗ = g̃j∗ + ϵ, greater or lower than its true
CSI value g̃j∗ . Indeed, the optimal choice of ϵ ∈ R is the
one that minimizes the function u given the choice on the
transmit power p ∈ {0, pmax} made by the BS. We define the








ϵ̂, if gk∗ > g̃j∗ ,
ϵ̌, otherwise, (46)
where the additive errors ê and ě must satisfy the following
conditions to allow the eavesdropper to mislead the transmitter,
ϵ̂ ∈ (|gk∗ − g̃j∗ | ,+∞) , (47)
ϵ̌ ∈ (−∞,− |gk∗ − g̃j∗ |) . (48)
We remark that according to the given formulation, for any
action adopted by the BS, the eavesdropper has infinite choices
in ϵ. Observing (44) and (46), we conclude that the best
strategy for the BS as well as the eavesdropper depends on
each other’s actions. Thus, in the following, we use game
theoretic tools to investigate this competitive interaction.
C. Two Player Game Formulation
We model the competitive interaction between the BS and
the eavesdropper by the following one-shot two-player zero
sum game:
G(gk∗ , g̃j∗) = {AB,Ae, u} . (49)
In the course of this game, both gk∗ and g̃j∗ are parameters
that are fixed and known to both players. The sets AB and Ae
contain the actions available to the BS and the eavesdropper:
AB = {0, pmax} , (50)
Ae = {ϵ̂, ϵ̌} . (51)
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For the sake of simplicity, we assume that both ϵ̂, and ϵ̌ are
fixed constants such that ϵ̂ > 0 and ϵ̌ < 0. That is, both sets
Ae and AB are finite.
The value of u does not depend on the exact value of the
additive error ϵ but only on its sign. When the actions p and
ϵ are played, the benefit of the transmitter is u (p, ϵ) while
the benefit of the eavesdropper is −u (p, ϵ). To explore the
optimal strategies of the two players, we use the concept of
the Nash equilibrium (NE), defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium): The strategy profile
(p∗, ϵ∗) ∈ AB × Ae is a Nash equilibrium of the game
G(gk∗ , g̃j∗) if
p∗ ∈ BRB (ϵ∗) and ϵ∗ ∈ BRe (p∗) . (52)
Following Def. 1, we state the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Equilibria in G(gk∗ , g̃j∗)): Let (p∗, ϵ∗) ∈ AB×
Ae be a Nash equilibrium of the game G(gk∗ , g̃j∗), with ϵ̂ > 0
and ϵ̌ < 0. Then,
• If gk∗ > g̃j∗ + ϵ̂, then (p∗, ϵ∗) ∈ {(pmax, ϵ̂), (pmax, ϵ̌)};
• If g̃j∗ + ϵ̂ > gk∗ > g̃j∗ , then (p∗, ϵ∗) ∈ {(pmax, ϵ̂)};
• If g̃j∗ > gk∗ > g̃j∗ + ϵ̌, then (p∗, ϵ∗) ∈ {(0, ϵ̌)}; and
• If g̃j∗ + ϵ̌ > gk∗ , then (p∗, ϵ∗) ∈ AB ×Ae.
The proof of Lemma 1 follows immediately from Def. 1. In
particular, Lemma 1 indicates that there always exists at least
one NE for the game G(gk∗ , g̃j∗), for all (gk∗ , g̃j∗) ∈ R2+.
Nonetheless, the equilibrium is not necessarily unique. For
instance when gk∗ > g̃j∗ and condition (47) is not met, there
exist two NEs: (pmax, ϵ̂) and (pmax, ϵ̌). More interestingly, in
this case, u(pmax, ϵ̂) = u(pmax, ϵ̌) = log( 1+gk
∗
1+g̃j∗
) > 0. That
is, independently of its forgery, the eavesdropper can neither
be allocated the channel nor eavesdrop the communication.
Hence, transmitting secret information to the receiver with
the highest channel gain, independently of the action of the
eavesdropper, is always a NE.
In contrast, when gk∗ > g̃j∗ and condition (47) is met,
there exists a unique NE: (pmax, ϵ̂) and u(pmax, ϵ̂) = 0. In
this case, the transmitter decides to transmit but it chooses the
eavesdropper as the destination as it appears as the receiver
with the highest channel gain. No leak of secret information
occurs. Albeit, the eavesdropper introduces a delay in the
communication of the transmitter with one of the legitimate
receivers.
On the contrary, when gk∗ < g̃j∗ and condition (48) is not
met, there exist four NEs. Basically, any possible combination
of actions is an NE and more interestingly u(pmax, ϵ̂) = 0
for all (pmax, ϵ̂) ∈ AB × Ae. This is due to the fact that the
transmitter, if it transmits, always chooses the eavesdropper
as the destination, and thus, no secret information is leaked.
However, none of the legitimate receivers is able to receive
secret information. On the contrary, when condition (48) is
met, there exists only one NE: (0, ϵ̌) and u(0, ϵ̌) = 0. Here,
the transmitter remains silent and no information is transmitted
to any of the destinations.
Thus, when conditions (47) and (48) are met the transmitter
is unable to convey secret messages to the legitimate desti-
nations at the NE. However, no leak of secret information
occurs either. This implies that when an eavesdropper is able
to properly set its additive error term ϵ, it cannot eavesdrop
secret messages but it can introduce an infinitely long delay
in the network before a legitimate destination receives a secret
message.
On the contrary, when the eavesdropper is unable to set
up its error terms ϵ following both (47) and (48), then the
transmitter is able to convey secret messages to the legitimate
receivers as long as gk∗ > g̃j∗ .
We describe the average secrecy rate (SR) at the NE in the
following proposition.
Proposition 5 [Expected value of the SR with one active
eavesdropper]: In the game G(gk∗ , g̃j∗) with K legitimate
users and a single active eavesdropper, when the conditions
(47) and (48) are not satisfied, the average secrecy rate at the
NE is













Otherwise, when both conditions (47) and (48) are true,
E [Rs(ϵ̂)] = 0. (54)
From Prop. 5, it can be inferred that when conditions (47)
and (48) are not met the respective loss in the achievable
average secrecy rate as a function of ϵ̂ is
∆Rs(ϵ̂) = E [C
∗
















The result in (55) shows that the larger ϵ̂ in the interval (47),
the more significant the reduction of the secrecy rate is with
respect to the case of a passive eavesdropper.
Another interesting point is that
lim
ϵ̂→∞
E [Rs(ϵ̂)] = 0, (56)
which implies that if the eavesdropper can choose ϵ̂ arbitrarily
large, it can fully block the transmission of secret messages
in the system. Nonetheless, an unreasonably large difference
|gk∗ − ǵj∗ | could be used as an indicator of the existence of
malicious behavior and serve as a tool for the identification of
active eavesdroppers, e.g. [37], [38].
VI. STOCHASTIC CHARACTERIZATION OF THE SC WITH
SIDE INFORMATION IN THE HIGH SNR REGIME
Interestingly, in the high SNR regime, for finite ϵ̂ <∞, the












This implies that in the high SNR regime, the SC of the system






































Fig. 14. Expected value of the SC in the high SNR regime in the presence
of one active or passive eavesdropper as a function of K.
Theorem 4 [Pdf of the SC in the High SNR]: In the high SNR
regime, the pdf fC∗
sH
(C∗sH) of the SC C
∗
sH in a set of K non-
colluding destinations in the presence of a single passive or
active eavesdropper can be expressed as
fC∗
sH







+ Pr(C∗k∗ ≤ C∗j∗)δ(C∗sH) (58)
where
C∗kH∗ = log(gk∗), (59)









(λ) = ln(2)2λf(2λ). (62)
Proposition 6 [Expected value and variance of the SC in the
high SNR]: In the high SNR regime, the expected value and
the variance of the SC in a set of K non-colluding destinations



































Numerical evaluations of the expected value and the stan-
dard deviation of the SC in the high SNR regime are depicted
in Fig. 14 and Fig. 15, respectively. It is clear that in such
scenarios opportunities of perfectly secure transmission can
be substantiated.
Finally, we have the following
Proposition 7 [Secrecy outage probability]: The secrecy out-








































Fig. 15. Standard deviation of the SC in the high SNR regime in the presence


















































Fig. 16. Probability of a secrecy outage with respect to a target threshold
SC value in the high SNR regime in the presence of one active or passive
eavesdropper as a function of K.
as the probability mass of fC∗
sH













The secrecy outage probability is depicted in Fig. 16. Notably,
it is demonstrated that for a medium cell size of K = 30
destinations in the presence of a single active or passive eaves-
dropper, a perfectly secure transmission rate of 0.5 bits/sec/Hz
is attainable more than 93% of the time.
VII. HEURISTIC TRANSMISSION STRATEGIES IN THE
HIGH SNR REGIME
In the following, we compare two heuristic transmission ap-
proaches. A systematic investigation of possible transmission
strategies is a subject for planned future research. The present
section serves as an example of how the results presented
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in this paper can be employed towards making informed
decisions regarding the allocation of resources, parametrically
to the network layout.
In the first approach, the BS always transmits at the destina-
tion with the highest reported CSI at a constant rate Rc equal
to the expected value of the SC minus the standard deviation,
i.e.,








− E [C∗sH ]
2
. (66)
In the second approach, the BS adopts an on/off approach
based on a comparison of the highest reported channel gain to
the expected value of the K-th order statistic of the channel
gains; the BS chooses not to transmit if the former is lower
than the latter. In the opposite case it transmits at a rate










− E [C∗sH ]
2
, gk∗ ≥ E [gk∗ ] ,
0, otherwise.
(67)
In the following we evaluate the information leaked in the
two heuristic strategies. In both cases it is assumed that the
BS employs encoding schemes that ensure perfect secrecy as
long as the transmission rate is smaller than the SC.
A. Constant Rate Transmission
For the constant rate transmission approach, information is
leaked to the eavesdropper during those transmission intervals
for which Rc ≥ C∗sH . The probability of this event is evaluated
as








K (gk∗)dF (g̃j∗). (68)
Therefore, in N transmission intervals, assuming N is suffi-
ciently large, the expected value of the information leaked,














B. Variable Rate Transmission
In the case of variable rate transmission, information is
leaked when gk∗ ≥ E [gk∗ ] and Rv ≥ C∗sH . These two events
are independent and as a result, information is leaked when
E [gk∗ ] ≤ gk∗ ≤ 2Rv g̃j∗ . Therefore, information is leaked
with probability Pv, evaluated as








K (gk∗)dF (g̃j∗). (70)
Clearly, Pv ≤ Pc. The expected value of the information
leaked, denoted by Iv(N), in N transmission intervals, as-



















































Fig. 17. Rate of information leaked for the constant rate and variable rate
transmission approaches in the high SNR regime in the presence of one active
or passive eavesdropper as a function of K.
In the constant rate approach, information is leaked with
a higher probability than in the variable rate approach. In
Fig. 17 we depict numerical evaluations of the rate of in-
formation leaked per transmission interval, i.e. Ic/N and
Iv/N , respectively. Interestingly, as the cell size increases, the
rate of information leaked is the same for both transmission
approaches, indicating that with increasing K, the K-th order
statistic of the channel gains is with a high probability close
to its expected value.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented an extensive set of results
regarding the stochastic characterization of SCs in wireless
multiuser networks. In our setting, a management unit wishes
to transmit secret messages to a set of destinations. It has
been demonstrated that in a purely antagonistic scenario
and in absence of any information about the existence of
potential eavesdroppers, such an endeavor could be seriously
compromised. Nevertheless, if quantitative side information is
available regarding the cardinality of the set of passive eaves-
droppers, substantial secrecy rates are attainable on average.
Indeed, the achievable secrecy rates increase with the ratio
between the number of legitimate users and the number of
eavesdroppers.
Furthermore, the effect of an active eavesdropper has been
systematically evaluated through the use of game theoretic
tools. Here, the difference between an active and a passive
eavesdropper is captured in behavioral aspects. The former,
interacts with the BS providing false feedback, for instance,
false CSI. We have formulated the competitive interaction
between the BS and the active eavesdropper as an one-shot
zero-sum game and evaluated upper bounds for the achievable
average secrecy rates. Our analysis suggests that in order
to minimize the loss incurred by such attacks, extra side
information is required.
Notably, we have found that in the high SNR regime,
the network is insensitive to the passiveness or activeness of
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the attack. It has been demonstrated that in such scenarios,
moderate perfectly secure rates are achievable with a very high
probability in medium size networks. Finally, the results pre-
sented in this paper can serve as the basis for the comparison
of practical transmission strategies with respect to the cell size.
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